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payments. Depending on the character of the foreign policy 
pursued by an unrestricted Germany, we find that the net effect 
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I 
‘No Hitler without Versailles’—although this may be somewhat oversimplified, most 
historians agree that the Treaty of Versailles of June 1919 was a necessary condition for 
the rise of the national socialist movement in Germany. A twofold argument is usually 
put forward to support this view. Firstly, nearly all Germans considered the provisions of 
the Treaty of Versailles deeply unfair and a national humiliation. This fuelled revanchist 
claims which the Nazis were eager to take up. Secondly, the reparation burden of the 
1920s, which was founded on the stipulation of Germany’s responsibility for the 
outbreak of the war, was seen as a major financial constraint that impeded economic 
growth and that increased the intensity of the distribution struggles that finally tore the 
young republic apart and paved the way for Adolf Hitler. 
The reparation payments were indeed a severe economic burden for Germany in the 
1920s. Between 1925 and 1930, the German economy was deprived of between one and 
2.2 billion Reichsmark (RM) annually, which amounted in the late 1920s to nearly 2.5 per 
cent of Germany’s GDP. The economic consequences of the Treaty of Versailles, 
however, were not confined to the issue of reparations, territorial losses, and human 
capital losses. Both political historians and economic historians have failed to discuss the 
fiscal consequences of another provision of the treaty that has always been analysed in 
political terms only: Germany was forced to reduce its military personnel to a mere 
100,000 soldiers in the army and 15,000 in the navy.2 In addition, the production, 
purchase, and deployment of advanced military technology was restricted or altogether 
interdicted. These restrictions must have had a beneficial impact on the Reich budget, 
and they must have enlarged the fiscal margins for the German governments. We must 
therefore ask whether the Treaty of Versailles, besides its many harmful effects on 
German society and the German economy, also offered a peace dividend to conquered 
Germany, like the one that is said to have helped Germany and Japan after the Second 
World War. 
As far as we can see, this subject has been seriously discussed by the contemporaries only 
in the years around 1920. When assessing Germany’s ability to pay, the reparation 
commission argued that Germany saved £50–100 million (1–2 billion Marks) in military 
costs annually. Keynes refuted this point by arguing that the savings were more than 
compensated for by the payments for pensions which cost Germany around £250 
                                                          
2 Usually simply referred to as 100,000-man army.  
 3
million (5 billion Marks) per year.3 Keynes, however, did not account for the inflation 
which boosted this figure. After 1924, when the currency had been stabilized, the annual 
payments to veterans and surviving dependants amounted to around several hundred 
million RM annually.4 In view of the question pursued here, it has to be stressed that 
these costs were not related to the Treaty of Versailles and that it is in any case doubtful 
whether payments to veterans and surviving dependants would have reduced the 
revanchists’ appetite for military power. However, it should be noted that in the second 
half of the 1920s, contemporaries seem to have hardly ever discussed the issue of saved 
military costs, neither in the media nor in the Reichstag.5 While the subject may have 
cropped up in contemporary debate from time to time, it certainly did not make its way 
into the history books.6
The fact that this topic has never been discussed is all the more astonishing as there are 
at least two academic debates on the disastrous impact that public finances had on 
German politics. First, there has been a large and productive discussion sparked by Knut 
Borchardt about whether Chancellor Brüning, who was in office from March 1930 to 
May 1932, had feasible alternatives to his procyclical economic policy that aggravated the 
dire economic situation. Those who agree with Borchardt that Brüning did not have 
much room for manoeuvre stress that the precarious situation of the Reich budget 
restrained Brüning enormously.7 This was all the more so given that large swathes of the 
public were hostile to expansionary fiscal policies that were believed to have led to 
inflation in the period from the end of the First World War until 1923. Secondly, the 
precarious state of the Reich’s finances is believed to have contributed to the banking 
crisis of July 1931, during which Germany had to abandon the gold standard.8 In both 
debates the Reich’s finances and the inability of the governments to build up any reserves 
in the so-called ‘golden years’ of the 1920s play a pivotal role. 
The question of why Germany’s finances were in such a desperate state is usually 
explained by a number of factors ranging from the structural weaknesses of the German 
                                                          
3 Keynes, Economic consequences, pp. 191–2. 
4  See Reichshaushaltsrechnung, section XII (‘Allgemeiner Pensionsfonds’, later ‘Versorgung und 
Ruhegehälter’). 
5  Klotz, Problem der Reparationen. 
6  We found a single reference, in which, without any substantiation, a military historian declared the 
question of saved military costs irrelevant; Köllner, Militär und Finanzen, p. 46. 
7  Borchardt, Wachstum; idem, ‘Decade of debate’; James, German slump; Ritschl, Deutschlands Krise. See also 
Balderston, Origins, ch. 7; Bachmann, Reichskasse. 
8  Ferguson, ‘Public finance’; Ferguson and Temin, 'Made in Germany'; Schnabel, ‘German twin crisis’.  
 4
economy inherited from the pre-1914 Empire to excessively generous welfare spending. 
Nobody questions the fact that reparations placed a burden on the Reich budget (and 
neither do we). Hence the significance of the question addressed here is obvious: if we 
find that the involuntary restriction of the army to 100,000 men led to a substantial 
alleviation of public finances, then the case for political failure is considerably 
strengthened, as Weimar’s politicians were unable to benefit from the peace dividend 
offered by the Treaty of Versailles. 
More specifically, this article addresses two questions. Firstly, how large were the savings 
for the German central budget, and secondly, how do they compare to the reparation 
burden? In order to assess the net effects for the central budget, it will also be necessary 
to discuss briefly the fiscal repercussion effects of increased additional military spending. 
Certainly, these research questions are profoundly ahistorical. Without the restrictions of 
the Treaty of Versailles, Germany would have spent more money on a much larger 
military. The restriction forced the Weimar Republic to cut public spending, against the 
preferences of many German taxpayers—but to what extent? In order to answer this 
question, we construct a counterfactual that takes as given the economic consequences 
of the Treaty of Versailles and its aftermath, in particular the substantial losses of real 
and human capital (population, foreign patents, and so on), but assumes that after the 
German currency stabilization of 1923–4 the allies released the restrictions on the size of 
the German military and waived the reparations. 
The next section is devoted to a brief description of the historical setting. This addresses 
the financing of the army in the late German Empire and discusses how the Weimar 
Republic dealt with those stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles that had continuous 
economic effects. In section III, our approach to assessing the savings effects of the 
military restriction is discussed in more detail, and several conceptual and methodological 
problems are addressed. We develop two counterfactual scenarios that will be filled with 
data in section IV, in which the net effects of saved military costs are compared to the 
reparation payments. Section V contains an analysis of possible economic repercussion 
effects that additional military spending might have had on public budgets, finding that 
even under quite rigorous assumptions the net economic burden of the Treaty of 
Versailles was much less heavy than has been hitherto thought, in particular if we confine 
our perspective to the Reich’s budget. Section VI concludes. 
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II 
After unification in 1871, Germany quickly became one of Europe’s leading powers. The 
image of a strong, even aggressive national state, however, obscures the fact that 
Germany’s military power was based on a surprisingly fragile fiscal constitution. The 
German Empire was a federal state, the Reich, dominated by its largest member state, 
Prussia. Prussia’s electoral law attributed voting power in favour of the elites (because 
votes were weighted according to the taxes one paid), and thus was much more able to 
keep the feared socialists at bay than was the Reich, which had a more democratic 
electoral law. Hence Prussia was very keen to keep the federal state financially 
dependent—the Reich was called the Kostgänger (boarder) of the member states. In 
particular, the member states kept their hands on the high-yielding income taxes, which 
were suited better than any other tax to securing the public share of a seemingly ever-
increasing national income. In broad terms one can say that the revenues of the member 
states relied on a mixture of direct taxes, indirect taxes, and the surplus of public 
operations (such as the very profitable Prussian railways), while the Reich budget was 
mainly confined to a number of important indirect taxes, in particular customs revenues.9
The safeguarding of national security was the main task of the Reich. In the course of 
Germany’s imperialistic quest for a ‘place in the sun’, the Reich increased military 
expenditure. Yet, as the Reich took on additional tasks, the share of military expenditure 
in the Reich budget fell. Shortly after the turn of the century, it still consumed around 45 
per cent of the Reich budget. The Reich’s fiscal dependency, however, remained 
unchanged. Ferguson has taken the hypothesis of under-endowment to the extreme. He 
argues that it was the structural deficiencies of the German fiscal constitution that made 
an armaments race against Germany’s main adversaries (France, Russia, and the UK) 
hopeless in the long run and thus induced the imperial military to conduct a pre-emptive 
strike in the summer of 1914.10
After Germany’s surrender in autumn 1918, both the size of its military and its fiscal 
constitution were fundamentally changed. In the Treaty of Versailles, Germany and her 
allies were forced to accept ‘the responsibility … for causing all the loss and damage to 
which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as 
                                                          
9  Schremmer, ‘Taxation’, pp. 465–6; Spoerer, ‘Evolution’. 
10  Ferguson, ‘Public finance’; idem, Pity of war, pp. 135–48. 
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a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her 
allies’ and the obligation to pay reparations.11
The prospect of having to pay large reparations had an important impact on Germany’s 
fiscal constitution. It was obvious that the Reich, not the member states, would have to 
pay the reparations so that the fundamental fiscal reform which had been discussed for at 
least two decades became unavoidable. In these reforms, which took place in 1919–20, 
the Reich’s fiscal position was accordingly reversed; now it was the member states who 
depended on central fiscal grants.12
The democratization of Germany and the centralization of her finances, however, did 
not lead to a more transparent budget, at least in view of military expenditure. In the 
years preceding the First World War, the federal government did not have any incentive 
to conceal the armaments programmes. Within Germany they were approved by the 
elites, and outside Germany the expenditure would have been perceived as a sign of 
military strength. After the war, when Germany was restricted to a 100,000-man army, a 
number of secret rearmament programmes had to be camouflaged in the budget. 
Historical research after the Second World War has uncovered these items. In financial 
terms, the sums spent in the 1920s on secret rearmament programmes, the ‘X-budget’, 
never exceeded 10 per cent of the ordinary (and disclosed) military budget.13 Hence 
military and economic historians found that the German military only insignificantly 
exceeded the limits of the Treaty of Versailles before 1933.14
III 
If we want to analyse the extent to which the reparations imposed by the Treaty of 
Versailles constrained the German governments’ fiscal room for manoeuvre, we also 
have to ask to what extent the restriction of the army to 100,000 men relieved the 
German budget. Therefore we need a symmetrical counterfactual in which Germany no 
longer had to pay reparations and was free to determine the size of its military 
expenditure (depicted in figure 1). 
 
                                                          
11  Treaty of Versailles, articles 231–47 (quotation from article 231). 
12  Holtfrerich, ‘Modernization’, pp. 126, 133–5. 
13  Nuss, Militär, pp. 190, 220, 340, 345; Zeidler, Reichswehr, p. 207. 
14  Deist, ‘Reichswehr’, p. 53; Tooze, Wages of destruction, p. 26. 
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Figure 1 Historical Situation and Counterfactual 
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How much would an unrestricted military have cost Germany? A natural point of 
comparison is the size of military expenditure a few years before the start of the 
armaments race that led to the First World War. In order to take account of the changes 
in territory and population imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, it seems reasonable to 
focus on ratios rather than levels. A first, very rough indicator is the ratio of the size of 
the military compared to the size of the population (henceforth ‘military ratio’). The ratio 
of military expenditure to the Reich budget or to total public budgets, a seemingly 
straightforward concept, is not a sensible measure. The postwar Reich budget comprised 
many more expenditure items than the prewar budget, especially welfare expenditure. 
Moreover, as indicated above, the fiscal structure of German public finances was totally 
redesigned, which renders any effort to compare budgets before and after the war 
meaningless for our purposes. The most adequate measure is undoubtedly the ratio of 
military expenditure to GDP (henceforth ‘expenditure ratio’).15
It is doubtful, however, whether a democratic Weimar Republic would have had the 
same inclination for military expenditure as the authoritarian German Empire. Thus in 
addition to a temporal comparison of prewar and postwar Germany, we also make 
international comparisons. Germany’s ratios are thus compared to those of France and 
the UK, who were democratic before and after the First World War, and also with that 
of a number of other European states and the US. The benchmark year chosen for the 
prewar period is 1912; other years before 1913 would also be suitable. Figure 2 illustrates 
that the public finances of the major European countries were affected by the run-up to 
the First World War only after 1912.16
                                                          
15  Kennedy, Rise and fall, p. 36; Eloranta, ‘Great illusion’, pp. 258–9. 
16  For a similar result, see Eloranta, ‘Great illusion’, p. 261. 
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Figure 2 The Expenditure Ratio 1909 to 1913 
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Sources: Table 2. 
 
We thus derive a grid of pre- and postwar ratios for Germany and several other 
European countries which allows us to assess a counterfactual estimate for the 
unconstrained German postwar ratios. This leads to an endogeneity problem. Had 
Germany been free to allocate as many resources to rearmament as it wished, this might 
have increased the armaments efforts of its neighbours. We thus construct two sets of 
counterfactual estimates, which are designed according to whether or not Germany’s 
neighbours perceived it as peaceful. 
IV 
As a first step in the analysis, it is necessary to assess the magnitude of the reparation 
payments and their sources. Table 1 lists the sources for the reparations actually paid 
between 1924 and 1929. The figures relate to fiscal years, that is, from 1 April to 31 
March of the following year. 
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Table 1 Sources for the reparation payments in million RM, 1924-29 
 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1924-29
Within the Reich budget   
(1) Reich budget ex (2) 0 145.4 276.0 529.8 935.4 956.6 2,843.3
(2) Transport tax 0 145.8 261.0 301.9 265.4 144.8 1,118.8
Outside the Reich budget   
(3) Railway obligations 100.3 396.4 572.1 605.4 658.2 385.0 2,717.3
(4) Industry obligations 0 62.5 187.6 274.7 299.7 423.7 1,248.2
(5) Other financial assets 473.3 330.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 144.4 947.7
(6) = (1) + (2)     Total A  0.0 291.3 537.0 831.7 1,200.8 1,101.4 3,962.2
(7) = ∑ (1) to (5) Total B 573.6 1,080.1 1,296.7 1,711.7 2,158.8 2,054.5 8,875.4
Notes:  Fiscal years from 1 April to 31 March.  Figures in the last column not deflated.  
Source: Reichshaushaltsrechnung (1925-1930).  
The expenditure side of the Reich budget was affected by the first two items only (line 6, 
total A). Railway obligations and industry obligations were forced loans that the newly 
founded Deutsche Reichsbahn and German manufacturing firms had to take out to pay their 
share of the reparations. Interest and debt repayment were de facto taxes. The 
obligations as well as the other financial assets were not formally channeled through the 
budget.17 Without the reparation burden, however, the Reich would not have been 
forced to levy the obligations, or would have been in a position to spend the revenues 
from the obligations otherwise. In any case, Weimar’s politicians were free to change the 
fiscal constitution accordingly. Ignoring these items simply because they were not a 
formal part of the budget is thus not very sensible. Henceforth, we discriminate between 
the formal fiscal burden on the Reich budget, total A, and the fiscal burden on what we 
call the ‘central budget’, total B. While it may be useful to look only at the Reich budget 
for questions pertaining to the fiscal margins of Weimar’s governments, the concept of 
the central budget is probably more meaningful for most fiscal and economic issues. 
We now turn to the counterfactual additional military costs that an unconstrained 
Germany would have faced. Table 2 presents information on the ratios of soldiers per 
head of population and the share of military expenditure in GDP (in nominal terms and 
in local currencies unless otherwise stated). 
                                                          
17  Cf. Reichshaushaltsplan (1928), section XX, p. 37, and annotations, p. 11.  
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Table 2  Military ratios and expenditure ratios for several European countries and the  
  United States, 1912-13 and 1924/1928 
 Military ratio Expenditure ratio 
 1912-13 1924 in % 1912 1928 in %
Germany 1.18 0.19 16 3.28 0.93 28
France 2.13 1.95 92 3.02 2.56 85
United Kingdom 0.81 0.77 95 3.40 2.77 81
Italy 0.83 0.64 77 3.35 2.94 88
Austria 2.54 0.84 33
Russia 3.69 2.37 64
Denmark 0.66 0.89 135 1.42 1.10 78
Belgium 0.78 1.03 132 1.20 1.34 112
Switzerland 0.38 0.39 103 1.14a 0.88 77
United States 0.09 0.10 111 0.89 0.84 94
Notes: a 1913 
Sources:  
Military: Militärwochenblatt (1924), no. 19, p. 522; Annuaire militaire (1924, 1926).  
Population: Maddison, World Economy, pp. 36-9, 43-4, 82, 96.  
Expenditure ratio Belgium Clement, Government consumption, Tables 1 and 18; Switzerland 1928: 
Eloranta, Demand, database milecon11.xls. 
Military expenditure in local currencies: Denmark Johansen, Dansk økonomisk statistik, pp. 351-8, for 
1912 all other from Stevenson, Armaments, p. 2, for 1928 Germany Statistisches Reichsamt, Statistisches 
Jahrbuch 1931, p. 438, all remaining from Statistisches Reichsamt, Finanzen, pp. 807-33.  
Nominal GDP in local currencies: Austria Kausel, Németh and Seidel, Österreichs Volkseinkommen, p. 44; 
Denmark Johansen, Dansk økonomisk statistik , pp. 392; France Toutain, 'Produit intérieur', pp. 57-58; 
Germany Ritschl and Spoerer, 'Bruttosozialprodukt', p. 51; Italy Rossi, Sorgato and Toniolo, 'Conti 
economici', p. 22; Russia Gregory, Russian national income, pp. 55, 59; UK Feinstein, Statistical tables, T12, 
col. 5; USA Kuznets, Capital, p. 562; USSR: Bergson, Real national income, p. 128. 
 
The military ratios show that the restriction to 100,000 men made—in relative terms—
the German army of the 1920s the smallest one in Europe. As the ratios for France and 
the UK decreased only slightly between 1912/13 and 1924, one might be tempted to put 
the hypothetical unconstrained German military ratio at about 1.0 which means the 
actual size times five, that is, nearly 600,000 men (in 1912, for a larger Germany, 
720,000). 
It would be premature, however, to inflate the counterfactual German military 
expenditure by a factor of five as well. The strategy of the German military after 1919 
was to work with a well-equipped rump army so that, once the 100,000-men constraint 
was removed, the ranks could be filled quickly with fresh recruits. Hence, despite the 
restrictions on heavy weapons such as battleships, submarines, tanks, and aircrafts, the 
capital intensity of the German army was probably higher than that of its counterparts.18
                                                          
18  It still was in the mid-1930s; see Köllner, Militär und Finanzen, p. 188. 
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The difficulties in accounting for the differences in the structures of the European 
military (army vs. navy, capital intensity) underlines once more the fact that the 
expenditure ratio is a more appropriate measure than the military ratio. We have chosen 
the year 1928 because German military expenditure reached its maximum in that year; 
hence the choice of 1928 is the least favourable for our hypotheses developed below.19
With regard to the expenditure ratio, the important message from table 2 is that before 
the First World War, all major European powers spent between 2.5 and 3.7 per cent of 
their GDP on armaments purposes regardless of whether they focused on the navy or 
the army. After the war, they quite uniformly reduced that share to between 2.5 and 3 per 
cent, or about 80–90 per cent of the prewar ratios. This grid serves as a benchmark for 
our counterfactual estimate. 
In 1912, the German expenditure ratio was close to 3.3 and thus within the range of the 
other major European powers.20 If we take the averages of the 1912 and 1928 ratios for 
France and the UK as a benchmark, then the unconstrained German expenditure ratio 
for 1928 would be (3.28 * 0.83 =) 2.72 rather than 0.93. In other words, unconstrained 
military expenditure in Germany would have risen by 190 per cent in the peaceful 
scenario a. 
This, however, is a static perspective. From a dynamic perspective that allows for 
endogeneity, one has to consider that an unconstrained Germany spending large sums on 
rearmament might have had effects on the military spending of her neighbours so that 
the strategic situation would resemble that before the First World War. If we take the 
pre-First World War equilibrium of 1912 as the benchmark, then Germany’s 
unconstrained military expenditure would have been simply 3.28. In other words, military 
costs would have risen by 250 per cent (scenario b).21
                                                          
19  As the League of Nations stopped publishing defence figures after 1928, we have to rely on the figures 
reported by a German official publication, Statistisches Reichsamt, ed., Finanzen, pp. 807–33. We cross-
checked whether the defence data for 1926 and 1927 in this source deviate from the last data published 
by the League of Nations (Annuaire statistique, pp. 177–9). The deviation is not much larger than 10% 
for any of the European countries reported on here. 
20  Our results deviate only slightly from those in Hobson, ‘Military-extraction gap’, pp. 478–9, and 
Stevenson, Armaments, p. 6, who use net national product rather than GDP, convert (1) NNP into 
constant prices and (2) all currencies into sterling, neither of which are necessary for our purposes and 
may even lead to distortions. 
21  The multiplication factors a and b are derived from the ratio of the counterfactual expenditure ratios to 
the actual expenditure ratios; that is, 2.72/0.93 – 1 = 1.92 for scenario a, 3.28/0.93 – 1 = 2.53 for 
scenario b. 
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Having derived the multiplication factors a (190 per cent) and b (250 per cent), we are 
now able to compute Germany’s counterfactual military expenses in the second half of 
the 1920s and set them in relation to the reparation payments (table 3). 
Table 3 Reparation payments and counterfactual military expenses, 1924-29, 
in million RM  
 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1924-29
Gross domestic product n.a. 71,214.0 73,828.0 83,157.0 89,042.0 89,322.0
 Reparation burden   
  (1) Reich budget A 0.0 291.3 537.0 831.7 1,200.8 1,101.4 3,962.2
  (2) central budget B 573.6 1,080.1 1,296.7 1,711.7 2,158.8 2,054.5 8,875.4
Military expenditure   
  (3) actual  427.2 633.3 704.2 769.2 827.0 757.5 4,118.4
  Net additional counterfactual   
  (4) Scenario a (+190%) 811.7 1,203.3 1,338.0 1,461.5 1,571.3 1,439.3 7,825.0
  (5) Scenario b (+250%) 1,068.0 1,583.3 1,760.5 1,923.0 2,067.5 1,893.8 10,296.0
Net counterfactual expenditure       
  (6) = (4) – (2) Ba 238.1 123.1 41.3 -250.2 -587.5 -615.2 -1,050.4
  (7) = (5) – (2) Bb 494.4 503.1 463.8 211.3 -91.3 -160.7 1,420.6
Notes:  Fiscal years from 1 April to 31 March.  Secret military expenditure not included in line (3) because 
it would have been overt in the counterfactual situation.  Figures in the last column not deflated. 
Sources: Table 2, text. 
 
The results are striking. If we confine our analysis to a comparison of the reparation 
burden borne by the Reich budget (calculation A, table 3, line 1) and the peaceful 
counterfactual (scenario a, line 4) then it becomes clear that over the whole period an 
unconstrained Reich would have spent nearly four billion RM more on additional 
armament expenses than it actually paid for reparations (line 4 minus line 1). This, 
however, is a somewhat superficial view. As argued above, although the main sources for 
the reparation payments were not formally channelled through the Reich budget they 
should nevertheless be interpreted as foregone tax revenues. Hence calculation B is 
probably more adequate to assess the fiscal burden of unconstrained military 
expenditure. 
If we assume that an unconstrained Germany was able to convince her neighbours that 
the rearmament was only for defensive purposes, the burden of the additional 
rearmament expenditure would have outweighed that of the reparations until 1926 and 
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would have equalled more than two-thirds of the reparation burden thereafter (scenario 
Ba, line 6), the net effect over the whole period being one billion RM more in reparation 
payments than in saved military costs. If Germany’s increased military spending had 
alerted her neighbours, a modest armaments race like the one preceding the First World 
War would have brought the expenditure ratio to 3.28 (as in 1912) and the additional 
military expenditure would have been less than the reparation payments, and only in 
small amounts, after 1927, the net effect over the whole period being a saving of nearly 
one and a half billion RM. In other words, even if the total central budget is taken into 
account (calculation B) the reparations were, depending on the character of Germany’s 
foreign policy, either only somewhat larger or even less than the self-imposed military 
burden. 
V 
In fiscal terms, our analysis has resulted in an astonishingly clear answer: the reparations 
cost the Weimar Republic not much more than unconstrained military spending would 
have. Were the reparations just the scapegoat on which Weimar’s politicians put the 
blame for their fiscal carelessness? This conclusion would be premature, as we have to 
assess whether military spending would have had beneficial effects for the Weimar 
economy which in turn would have refilled the public coffers. 
In a democracy, the legitimization for defence spending is that the military protects the 
country against external threats. This would undoubtedly have been the argument of 
Weimar’s politicians to enforce additional military expenditure had they been free to do 
so. However, we have the benefit of hindsight. Before Hitler came to power, Germany 
had not been attacked by foreign powers, nor had it been the subject of military 
extortion after 1923. In fact, the Treaty of Versailles served as a protection device for 
Germany, as France and The UK (and indirectly the US as their creditor) had an interest 
in receiving the reparation payments, which was a credible deterrent for potential 
invaders from other countries. Hence the 100,000-man army was fully sufficient for 
defensive purposes.22
                                                          
22  If there was anything like a threat, it was Poland. However, Poland was reckoned not to have any 
further territorial claims against Germany. The situation changed only somewhat when General 
Pilsudski came to power in 1926; see Schattkowsky, ‘Im Schatten von Versailles’; Burk, ‘Planungen’, pp. 
43–5. 
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If a larger army did not have political benefits, would it have been beneficial in economic 
terms? The resources that Germany spent on reparations were lost.23 In contrast, the 
additional resources that could have been invested in military spending would have 
remained in the domestic economy. This raises the more general question of whether 
defence expenditure has beneficial economic effects. In the macroeconomic literature, 
which relies on the augmented Solow or the Barro models, the long-term impact of 
defence expenditure is usually found to be zero or negative, thus confirming the 
Cobdenite assumption that military expenditure retards economic growth.24
One might speculate, however, that military expenditure might have boosted the Weimar 
economy in the short term. Obviously, the question of whether increased military 
spending would have had any real effect depends on the extent of German industry’s 
excess capacity in the second half of the 1920s. If the capacity was fully utilized, 
additional military spending would simply have crowded out private demand or 
investment. Table 4 illustrates the capacity utilization in German industry and commerce. 
Table 4 Capacity utilization in German manufacturing, 1924-29 (per cent) 
 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 
Industry and commerce 84 89 81 90 90 88 
Investment goods industry 73a 70 
  Vehicles 50a 57 
  Electrical engineering 80a 78 
  Precision instrum., optical 71a 63 
Textile industry 74a 72 
Notes:  a July to December only.  Capacity utilization measured by ratio of workers actually employed to 
potential workplaces in the first line, and elsewhere by ratio of hours actually worked to potential 
hours. 
Sources: First line Balderston, Origins, p. 373, col. B; all other Wagemann, Konjunkturstatistisches Handbuch, 
pp. 25-31. 
 
According to Balderston’s estimates (first line), German firms were on average working 
close to capacity, and additional military procurement would have simply crowded out 
civilian orders. This fits with anecdotal evidence that German industrialists were reluctant 
                                                          
23  In fact, rather than earning current account surpluses to finance the reparations Germany attracted 
large foreign capital inflows so that her foreign debt was commercialized; see Ritschl, ‘“Dancing on a 
volcano”’. Yet the massive inflows of foreign capital affected the central budgets at best indirectly via 
higher tax revenues and higher interest costs. 
24  Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller, ‘Determinants of long-term growth’, pp. 824-5; Dunne, Smith, 
and Willenbockel, ‘Models of military expenditure’; Aizenman and Glick, ‘Military expenditure’. 
 15
to seek military procurement contracts. Only later, in the course of the great slump, did 
industrialists seek to contact the army.25
However, a closer inspection of industrial capacity utilization reveals that at least in some 
businesses military procurement might have been welcome. In the second half of 1928, 
the first period for which detailed branch data are available, the capacity utilization in 
vehicles, instruments and optics, and the textile industry was far below the average (table 
4). 
Hence, for the sake of the argument, it might make sense to assume that an increase in 
military expenditure had positive short-term repercussion effects on the economy via 
military procurement contracts and soldiers’ wages. In order to assess the magnitude of 
possible repercussions on the central budgets, it is necessary to have data on the 
multiplicator of armaments expenditure and the tax quota. Following Ritschl’s analysis, 
the multiplicator of government expenditure in the Weimar Republic between 1925 and 
1930 was close to zero, with a maximum in 1927 (approximately 0.5).26 In the following, 
we nevertheless assume a value of one, which is presumably quite high, in particular for 
armaments expenditure.27 The tax quota amounted to 15 per cent throughout the second 
half of the 1920s.28 Table 5 replicates the results of table 3 assuming that 50 per cent of 
the additional taxes went into the central budgets. Lines 4 and 5 include additional 
military costs net of additional tax revenues which flow back to the central budgets. 
In both lines 6 and 7, the sign reverses one year earlier than in table 3, but the main 
results remain unchanged. In 1929, the net burden of the reparations compared to 
unrestricted rearmament turns out at some 700 million (peaceful scenario a’) or 300 
million (aggressive scenario b’) RM. In the latter case, and viewed over the whole period, 
the payment of reparations is still 0.65 billion RM less costly than having an unrestricted 
army. If one confines the perspective to the Reich budget, the starting point of our 
analysis, the main finding is still unequivocally that paying reparations was cheaper than 
financing the build-up of a new, powerful German army. Figure 3 illustrates this for the 
fiscal year 1927/8, the peak of the Weimar Republic’s business cycle. Although additional 
military spending leads to an increase in the Reich budget due to induced tax revenues, 
                                                          
25  Hansen, Reichswehr, pp. 205–6; see also Nuss, Militär, p. 191. 
26  Ritschl, Deutschlands Krise, pp. 58, 67. 
27  Note that we neglect the substantial savings that emerge from a reduction of unemployment and 
welfare relief had more soldiers been on the military payroll.  
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what remains for non-defence purposes becomes smaller, as the additional military costs 
are larger than the waived reparation payments. 
Table 5 Reparation payments and counterfactual military expenses 
including multiplicator effects, 1924-29, in million RM  
 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1924-29
Gross domestic product   
  Scenario a' n.a. 72,411 75,166 84,618 90,613 90,761
  Scenario b' n.a. 72,791 75,589 85,080 91,110 91,216
 Reparation burden   
  (1) Reich budget A 0.0 291.3 537.0 831.7 1,200.8 1,101.4 3,962.2
  (2) central budget B 573.6 1,080.1 1,296.7 1,711.7 2,158.8 2,054.5 8,875.4
Military expenditure   
  (3) actual  427.2 633.3 704.2 769.2 827.0 757.5 4,118.4
  Net additional counterfactual   
  (4) Scenario a' (+176%) 750.8 1,113.0 1,237.6 1,351.9 1,453.5 1,331.3 7,238.1
  (5) Scenario b' (+231%) 987.9 1,464.5 1,628.5 1,778.8 1,912.4 1,751.7 9,523.8
Net counterfactual expenditure       
  (6) = (4) – (2) Ba' 177.2 32.9 -59.1 -359.8 -705.3 -723.2 -1,637.3
  (7) = (5) – (2) Bb' 414.3 384.4 331.7 67.1 -246.3 -302.8 648.4
Notes:  Fiscal years from 1 April to 31 March.  Secret military expenditure not included in line (3) because 
it would have been overt in the counterfactual situation.  Figures in the last column not deflated. 
Sources: Table 2 and text. 
VI 
A lot of the reasoning in this article is necessarily speculative, and one might imagine 
different scenarios which lead to modified results. However, the main message should be 
clear. The Treaty of Versailles put a large burden on the Weimar Republic, which had to 
pay for the sins of the elites ruling prior to 1918. Nevertheless, the restriction of the army 
to 100,000 men, though politically a humiliation, was beneficial in fiscal terms. From a 
purely formal perspective, even our most conservative scenario (Aa’) puts the additional 
military costs of an unconstrained German military much higher than the reparations 
which had to be paid directly from the Reich budget. Hence the restriction of the size of 
the army was clearly beneficial for the Reich budget. From a less narrow fiscal 
perspective—that is, if the total budgetary and non-budgetary reparation burden is 
                                                                                                                                                                      
28  Calculated from Statistisches Reichsamt, ed., Finanzen, p. 224, and Ritschl and Spoerer, 
‘Bruttosozialprodukt’, pp. 53–4. 
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compared to the hypothetical additional military costs—the answer depends on whether 
Germany would have been able to convince its neighbours that it was peaceful. Had it 
succeeded, in this scenario (Ba’) Germany would have borne additional military costs that 
amounted in the late 1920s to more than 80 per cent of the reparation payments (table 5, 
last column, lines 4 and 2). If, however, Germany’s neighbours remained sceptical, a 
modest arms race would have led to costs for Germany that outweighed the full fiscal 
burden of the reparation. In both scenarios the Treaty of Versailles, while overall clearly 
a burden on the German economy, also offered a substantial peace dividend for 
Weimar’s non-revanchist budget politicians. The fact that they did not make sufficient 
use of this imposed gift supports the hypothesis that the Weimar Republic suffered from 
home-made political failure. 
APPENDIX: THE STRUCTURE OF THE GERMAN BUDGETS, 1924/5–1929/30 
The receipt-expenditure accounting of the Reich is systematically conceived in such a 
way that it first depicts the receipts, followed by the expenditures of the different discrete 
budgets in a highly simplified manner. The discrete budgets are divided into sections 
relating to the President of the German Reich, the Reich Ministry of the Interior, the 
Reich Ministry of the Armed Forces, and the Reich Ministry of Labour. Including a short 
repetition of the summation of the discrete budgets (included in the receipt-expenditure 
accounting for the purpose of monitoring), this part of the receipt-expenditure 
accounting of the Reich consists of approximately 30 pages. In the remaining part 
(usually over 400 pages), the focus is again on the discrete budgets. 
The budget of the Reich can be divided into an ordinary budget consisting of continuous 
expenditures and discrete expenditures, and an extraordinary budget. Article 87 of the 
Weimar Constitution stipulates that loans can only be granted in cases of extraordinary 
purposes and, in addition, if used for ‘promoting purposes’ (for example, investments). 
After presenting the ordinary receipts, the first overview of the discrete budgets displays 
subsection (a) of the ordinary expenditures. This subsection contains the continuous 
expenditures of the Reich budget. The Reich Ministry of the Armed Forces is divided 
into four subsections, (A) representing the Reich Minister, (B) the Department of the 
Armed Forces (Heereswesen), (C) institutions not belonging to the Armed Forces (that is, 
the ‘Peace Commission’ (Friedenskommission)), and (D) the navy. Non-recurring 
expenditures are represented in subsection (b) of the ordinary budget, following the same 
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scheme as in subsection (a). It follows an overview of the extraordinary budget. 
According to the scheme described earlier, the extraordinary receipts are followed by the 
extraordinary expenditures in four subsections, A–D. The declared totals are included in 
table 3, line 3. Overall, they sum up to the total expenditure budget of the Reich Ministry 
of the Armed Forces. 
 
How total defence expenditure is calculated 
For the period 1924–7, the war burden is recorded in a separate budget. This second 
budget consists of book entries which are represented in the primary budget within the 
subsection ‘General Financial Administration’. Consequently, this leads to a prolongation 
of the overall budget. 
In order to derive meaningful ratios of the discrete budgets in relation to the overall 
expenditures, this step has to be reversed. This can be achieved by subtracting the 
expenditures of the war burden budget from the sum of all expenditures. In order to be 
able to compare the discrete budgets with each other, it is necessary to subtract the war 
burden expenditures from the expenditures of the ‘General Financial Administration’. 
 
The war burden budget 
The ordinary part of the war burden budget for the period 1924–7 includes, as an 
example, payments that correspond to the occupation of the Rhineland. The payments 
attached to the Dawes Plan are displayed in the extraordinary budget under the heading 
‘In fulfillment of the external expert opinion’. The discrete figures can be found in a later 
and more extensive section under the heading ‘XX War burden’ (called ‘XX Execution 
of the peace treaty’ in the budget for 1924). For 1928, the war burden budget is no 
longer accounted for as a special budget. Hence, the Dawes payments are listed under 
‘XX War burden’ within the ordinary budget. Furthermore, in 1928 the payments of the 
industry and railroad obligations are no longer accounted for by the budget. They are 
listed in the notes of the receipt-expenditure accounting and are thus only represented in 
quotation marks in the table. They serve as a completion of the Dawes figures. 
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